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RSSI-based Secure Localization in the Presence
of Malicious Nodes in Sensor Networks
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Abstract
The ability of a sensor node to determine its location in a sensor network is important in many
applications. The infrastructure for the location-based services is an easy target for malicious attacks. We
address scenarios where malicious node(s) attempt to disrupt, in an uncoordinated or coordinated manner,
the localization process of a target node. We propose four techniques for secure localization: weighted
least square (WLS), secure weighted least square (SWLS), and ℓ1-norm based techniques LN-1 and LN-
1E, in a network that includes one or more compromised anchor nodes. WLS and SWLS techniques
are shown to offer significant advantage over existing techniques by assigning larger weights to the
anchor nodes that are closer to the target node, and by detecting the malicious nodes and eliminating
their measurements from the localization process. In a coordinated attack, the localization problem can
be posed as a plane fitting problem where the measurements from non-malicious and malicious anchor
nodes lie on two different planes. LN-1E technique estimates these two planes and prevents disruption of
the localization process. The Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB) for the position estimate is also derived.
The proposed techniques are shown to provide better localization accuracy than the existing algorithms.
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(CRLB), least square (LS), secure localization.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid developments in the field of micro-electronics, integrated circuit fabrication, and em-
bedded software have increased the computational power, lifetime, and sensing capabilities
of wireless sensor nodes. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is formed by a collection of
authenticated sensor nodes that communicate among themselves and cooperate for a common
purpose. These nodes collect data and transmit it to the base station for further processing.
As the monitoring area grows larger, the number of sensor nodes in a network increases and
it becomes difficult to keep track of the locations of the sensor nodes manually. However,
in the absence of accurate location information, the data from the sensors are not very useful.
Localization methods based on different techniques have been presented in the literature including
those based on optimization [1]–[3], graph [4], [5], game theory [6], least squares [7], [8], and
fingerprinting [9], [10].
Localization techniques are broadly divided into two categories: range-based techniques [11]–
[14], and range-free techniques [15], [16]. For determining the position of the target node,
range-based techniques use the distance between the target node (node whose location is not
known at the time of deployment) and the anchors (nodes whose locations are known at the time
of deployment), whereas range-free techniques only use the connectivity information between the
nodes. Scenarios where location-based services are used include monitoring activities and move-
ment patterns in farm animals [17], metropolitan air quality monitoring [18], monitoring toddlers
and elderly persons, tracking goods in the supply chain industry [19], land slide detection [20],
and navigation tool for people in places such as shopping malls and airports.
These location-based services are not immune to security threats including cryptographic
attacks such as unauthorized access or modification of the information. Attackers can also gain
unauthorized access to the infrastructure responsible for carrying out the localization and/or
modify the code on the sensor nodes and turn them into malicious nodes (non-cryptographic
attacks). A malicious node does not provide correct information required for localization to the
target node. Both types of attacks can result in erroneous location estimation of the target nodes.
For determining its location, the target node requires certain information from its neighbouring
nodes namely, received signal strength information [21], time of flight (for time of arrival (ToA)
or time difference of arrival (TDoA)-based techniques), or connectivity (for techniques such as
DV-Hop [22]) information. Various types of attacks on localization techniques have been studied
3in the literature [23] such as impersonation (malicious node masquerading as an honest node),
distance fraud (malicious node reporting information resulting in incorrect distance estimation
such as by arbitrarily varying the transmit power level), time fraud (malicious nodes including
incorrect time stamp into the packets sent to the target node), and Sybil attack (malicious node
claiming multiple identities/locations representing multiple nodes).
A non-malicious node can also seem to behave like a malicious node if the wireless link
between this node and the target node is affected. This can happen if the direct path between the
anchor and target node is obstructed, or the transmit antenna is damaged resulting in unusual
variation in RSSI values. In addition, distance estimation can be affected due to environmental
changes as the path loss exponent depends on temperature and humidity [24], [25]. In such
scenarios the localization process can be adversely affected. A GPS signal simulator can initiate
a GPS spoofing attack by generating incorrect GPS signals to deceive a GPS receiver [26], [27].
Similarly, spoofed radio signals can disrupt the localization process in a WSN.
In this paper, we present four RSSI-based secure localization techniques. We consider the
scenario where a target node attempts to localize itself using RSSI values from its neighboring
anchor nodes. It is assumed that the anchors transmit at a fixed predefined power level. However,
some of the anchor nodes individually or collaboratively change their transmit power without
informing the target node in order to disrupt the localization process.
We propose four secure localization techniques: weighted least squares (WLS) [28], secure
weighted least squares (SWLS), and ℓ1-norm based localization techniques LN-1 and LN-1E for
node location estimation in the presence of malicious anchor nodes using RSSI measurements.
We consider both uncoordinated and coordinated attacks by malicious node(s) to disrupt the
localization process. We present extensive performance evaluation of the proposed techniques
and comparison with two existing secure localization methods, Grad-Desc [29] and LMdS [30].
We also derive the Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB) on the root mean square error (RMSE) of
the position estimate under uncoordinated and coordinated attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses prior work in the area
of secure localization techniques in WSN. Section III presents the problem formulation and
Section IV describes the proposed methods for secure localization. The CRLB for uncoordinated
and coordinated attack is derived in Section V. Section VI presents the performance evaluation
of the proposed techniques under uncoordinated and coordinated attack. Section VII concludes
the paper.
4Notation: Uppercase bold letters represent matrices and lowercase bold letters represent
vectors. diag(·) represents a diagonal matrix. ‖·‖1 and ‖·‖2 represent the ℓ1-norm and ℓ2-norm,
respectively. The cardinality of set A is denoted by card(A).
II. RELATED WORK
Lazos and Poovendran [31] proposed a secure localization technique, named SEcure Range-
independent LOCalization scheme (SeRLoc), in which the target node determines its position by
using beacon information transmitted by both benevolent and malicious anchor nodes. SeRLoc
was shown to be resilient to wormhole attack, Sybil attack, and compromise of network entities.
Liu et al. [32] proposed two range-based localization techniques namely attack-resistant minimum
mean square estimation (ARMMSE) and a voting-based scheme. In ARMMSE, malicious anchor
nodes are identified by examining the inconsistency among location references indicated by mean
square error of estimation. In the voting-based scheme, the network area is divided into a grid
and a node votes for a grid cell if the distance of the grid cell to an anchor node is approximately
equal to the estimated distance between the target and anchor node. The target node location is
estimated as the centroid of the cell with the highest number of votes.
Li et al. [30] considered two robust localization techniques namely, triangulation and RF-
based fingerprinting. For triangulation, they proposed an adaptive least squares and least median
of squares (LMdS) based location estimation, and for RF fingerprinting they used a median-based
distance metric. In LMdS method, anchors are divided into many subsets of identical sizes with
each subset estimating the target node location using least squares. The final target node location
is given by the least squares location estimate of the subset with the smallest median residue.
It was observed that this subset in an attack scenario is least likely to contain malicious nodes.
However, it is assumed that the number of malicious nodes is less than 50% of the number of
anchor nodes.
Garg et al. [29] proposed an iterative gradient descent technique with inconsistent measure-
ment pruning to achieve accurate localization in the presence of malicious nodes in a WSN.
They consider mobile sensor networks where the nodes are mobile and some of them may
be compromised and thus transmit false information. Assuming the measurement noise to be
Gaussian the likelihood of the measurements is maximized. To account for the possibility of
malicious nodes, the cost function is updated at each iteration by eliminating the anchor nodes
with large residues from the localization process.
5Jha et al. [33] implemented secure localization in WSN using a game theoretic approach.
Their proposed technique combines least trimmed square (LTS) and game theoretic aggregation
(GTA) algorithms. In the LTS phase, the technique learns the weights for each of the anchor
nodes. These weights corresponds to the reputation of the anchor nodes i.e., nodes with lower
weights are likely to be compromised and malicious. Robust localization is achieved using GTA
by filtering out information from the malicious anchor nodes.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network with N anchor nodes whose locations are known, and one or more target
nodes whose locations are to be determined. It is assumed that all the anchor nodes are within
the communication range of the target node. The nodes are assumed to transmit at a predefined
power level. The target node measures RSSI values of the packets received from the anchor
nodes and estimates its distance from each of the anchor nodes. Localization techniques allow
the target node to estimate its location using the estimated distances and the known locations of
the anchor nodes.
Assuming the signal power loss is dominated by path loss which can be modeled using the
log-distance model [8]:
pr = p0−10n log10(d) (1)
where pr is the received power at the target node, p0 is the transmit power of the anchor node,
n is the path loss exponent, and d is the distance between the target and the anchor node.
Let coordinates of the target and N anchor nodes be represented by t = [tx, ty]T and ai =[
axi ,a
y
i
]T
where i = 1, . . . ,N, respectively. The anchor nodes are assumed to broadcast packets
at regular intervals. Let pri j represent RSSI value of the j
th packet received from the ith anchor
node. Using (1) and the RSSI value from the jth packet, the target node computes its distance
from the ith anchor node as di j = 10
(p0−pri j)
10n . Next consider that some of the anchor nodes are
malicious and attempt to disrupt the localization process. Two types of localization attacks are
considered: uncoordinated and coordinated attacks. In an uncoordinated attack, the malicious
node(s) act independently and attempt to disrupt the localization process of the target node,
whereas in a coordinated attack the malicious nodes coordinate among themselves in order to
make the target node appear to be located at a location different from its actual location. These
attacks are illustrated in Fig. 1 and can be modeled as described next [29], [33].
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Fig. 1: Attack strategies by malicious anchor nodes in a WSN. The dashed circles represent the
estimated distance between the target and malicious anchor nodes, and the dotted circles represent
the estimated distance between the target and non-malicious anchor nodes in the absence of
measurement noise.
1) Uncoordinated attack: We consider non-cryptographic attacks where the malicious nodes
change their transmit power levels arbitrarily and do not report it to the target node. This type
of attack can be modeled as:
pri =
 p0−10n log10(di)+η if node i is non-malicious
p0i −10n log10(di)+η if node i is malicious,
(2)
where η ∼ N (0,σ2) is a Gaussian random variable representing measurement noise, di =
‖t−ai‖2 is the distance between the ith anchor node located at ai and the actual target node
located at t, p0 is the predefined transmit power of the anchor nodes, p0i is the transmit power of
the ith malicious anchor node, and pri is the received power at the target node from the i
th anchor
node. Let p0i = p0+κ where κ ∼N (0,σ2att) is a Gaussian random variable with variance σ2att
representing the uncertainty introduced by the malicious anchor nodes in their transmit power
levels to disrupt the localization process.
Fig. 1(a) illustrates an uncoordinated attack where a target node attempts to localize itself
using information from 7 anchor nodes of which 3 are malicious. The malicious anchor nodes
change their transmit power levels dynamically and since the target node is not aware of their
7true transmit power (p0i), it incorrectly estimates its distance from the malicious anchor nodes
resulting in large error in its estimated location.
2) Coordinated attack: Coordinated attacks are stronger attacks than the uncoordinated attacks
as in coordinated attacks the malicious nodes communicate among themselves with the aim to
make the target node appear to be located at a location different from its actual location. It is
assumed that the malicious anchor nodes are aware of the actual location of the target node. The
coordinated attack can be modeled as:
pri =
 p0−10n log10(di)+η if node i is non-malicious,
pc0i −10n log10(di)+η if node i is malicious
(3)
where di = ‖t−ai‖2, pc0i = p0−10n log10(χi) with χi =
‖tatt−ai‖2
‖t−ai‖2 . tatt is the location where the
malicious anchor nodes are trying to make the target node appear to be located, and pc0i is the
transmit power of the ith malicious anchor node. Thus, χi is the factor by which the malicious
anchor nodes scale the actual distance between themselves and the target node.
A coordinated attack is shown in Fig. 1(b) where 3 malicious anchor nodes attempt to make
the target node appear to be located at tatt instead of its actual location t. It is seen that the
dashed circles, with radius equal to the erroneous distance between the malicious anchor nodes
and the target node, intersect at tatt, whereas the dotted circles with radius equal to the actual
distance between the non-malicious anchor nodes and the target node intersect at t.
IV. PROPOSED TECHNIQUES FOR SECURE LOCALIZATION
The variation in the received power (pr) as a function of the distance (d) between the anchor
and target node is shown in Fig. 2. From (1):
d = 10
(
p0−pr
10n
)
⇒ d = c 10−p
r
10n (4)
where c = 10
p0
10n . As the relationship between pr and d is non-linear, variations in the received
power affect the estimated distance in a non-linear manner. From Fig. 2, it is seen that the
distance estimates are more robust to noise when the anchor nodes are close to the target node
than when the anchor nodes are farther from the target node. Thus, anchor nodes closer to the
target node should be given a larger weight in the localization process than anchor nodes that
are farther.
In Fig. 2, a target node that receives packet with power prk from the k
th anchor node is estimated
to be at a distance dk from it. Positive and negative variations in the received power
(
prk
)
are
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Fig. 2: Effect on distance estimation due to variations in the received power.
represented by δ
p
k+ and δ
p
k−, and the corresponding variation in distance estimates are represented
by δ dk− and δ
d
k+. Lemma IV.1 quantifies the variation in the estimated distance corresponding to
a variation in the received power.
Lemma IV.1. δ dk− = g
(
δ p
k+
)
10−
pr
k
10n and δ dk+ = −g
(−δ p
k−
)
10−
pr
k
10n where g(x) = c
(
1−10 −x10n
)
and δ dk+,δ
d
k−,δ
p
k+,δ
p
k− are all positive quantities.
Proof. dk−δ dk−= c10−
pr
k
+δ
p
k+
10n ,δ dk−= c10
−pr
k
10n −c10−
pr
k
+δ
p
k+
10n = 10−
pr
k
10n c
(
1−10
−δ p
k+
10n
)
= 10−
pr
k
10n g
(
δ
p
k+
)
.
Similarly, dk +δ
d
k+ = c10
− p
r
k
−δ p
k−
10n ⇒ δ dk+ =−10−
pr
k
10n g
(−δ pk−).
Lemma IV.2. For the same amount of variation (δ
p
k ) on the received power p
r
k, the received
power with negative deviation (prk−δ pk ) will result in larger variation in the distance estimate
than the received power with positive deviation (prk+δ
p
k ) i.e., if δ
p
k+ = δ
p
k− = δ
p
k , then δ
d
k+ > δ
d
k−.
Proof. Using Lemma IV.1 it can be shown that
g(x)+g(−x) = c
(
2−10 −x10n −10 x10n
)
=−
(
c10
−x
10n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(
10
x
10n −1
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
≤ 0 (5)
g(x)+g(−x) is always negative because a and b are always positive for all x ∈ R.
9The variation in distance corresponding to the negative and positive change in received power
prk are given by dk +δ
d
k+ and dk−δ dk−, respectively. From Lemma IV.1:
δ dk+ =−g(−δ pk )10
pr
k
10n and δ dk− = g(δ
p
k )10
pr
k
10n (6)
Using (5) and (6), it is seen that δ dk+ ≥ δ dk− when δ pk+ = δ pk− = δ pk (refer Fig. 2).
Lemma IV.3 states that the distance estimation using RSSI values from anchor nodes that are
farther from the target node is less robust to variation in the received power.
Lemma IV.3. For the same amount of variation at two different received power levels, the
lower received power level will result in larger variation in the distance estimate than the
higher received power level i.e., if pr1 > p
r
2 and δ
p
1 = δ
p
2 , then δ
d
2 > δ
d
1 .
Proof. If variation in the received power levels is positive i.e., pr1 + δ
p
1 and p
r
2 + δ
p
2 where
δ p1 = δ
p
2 , then the relationship between the corresponding variations in distance estimates is
δ d2 > δ
d
1 . Using Lemma IV.1:
pr1 > p
r
2 ⇒ g
(
δ p2
)
10
−pr
2
10n > g
(
δ p1
)
10
−pr
1
10n ⇒ δ d2 > δ d1 (7)
This relationship also holds if the variation in the received power levels is negative.
From Lemma IV.3, we can say that the malicious nodes that are closer to the target node can
have a greater impact in disrupting the localization process than nodes that are farther. To reduce
the effect of the malicious anchor nodes we next propose secure localization techniques.
A. Weighted Least Square (WLS)
We propose a secure localization technique based on the weighted least squares algorithm [28].
This is a modified version of the least squares [7] where the anchor nodes are assigned weights
based on their distance from the target node. The target receives P packets from each of the
anchor nodes and computes the mean received power as pri =
1
P ∑
P
j=1 p
r
i j.
Using pri , the target node estimates its distance from the i
th anchor node as di. Given ai and di
for i = 1, . . . ,N, the target node position estimation can be formulated as a weighted least squares
problem where each of the distance estimates is weighted by the variance of di
2
. Assuming the
distance estimate to be a random variable, its cumulative distribution function (CDF) is:
P(di ≤ γ) = P
(
η
σ
≤ p
r
i − p0+10n log10 γ
σ
)
= 1−Q( f (γ))
10
where Q(·) is the Q-function and f (γ) = 10nσ log10
(
γ
di
)
. The probability density function (PDF)
of di can be shown to be:
fdi(γ) =
5n
γσ ln(10)
√
2
pi
exp
−50n2 ln2
(
γ
di
)
σ2 ln2(10)
 (8)
Using (8), the variance of di and d
2
i can be shown to be:
fVardi (di,σ) = d
2
i exp
(
σ2
18.86n2
)[
exp
(
σ2
18.86n2
)
−1
]
(9)
fVar
d2i
(di,σ) = d
4
i exp
(
σ2
4.715n2
)[
exp
(
σ2
4.715n2
)
−1
]
(10)
The measurement matrix Pr
(
=
[
pri j
]
where i = 1, . . . ,N and j = 1, . . . ,P
)
consists of the RSSI
values of the P packets received by the target node from each of the N anchor nodes (both
malicious and non-malicious nodes). Consider a diagonal weighing matrix W whose elements
are inverse of the variance of d2i . The measurement model can be expressed as At+ε = b where
A and b are given in terms of the anchor node positions (ai) and distance estimates (di) as:
A =

−2ax1 −2ay1 1
−2ax2 −2ay2 1
...
...
...
−2axN −2ayN 1
 , b =

d1
2− (ax1)2− (ay1)2
d2
2− (ax2)2− (ay2)2
...
dN
2− (axN)2− (ayN)2
 (11)
Assuming the measurement noise ε to be Gaussian distributed, estimation of the target node
position can be formulated as a weighted least squares problem and Algorithm 1 presents the
WLS secure localization technique.
B. Secure Weighted Least Square (SWLS)
Consider an uncoordinated attack scenario where the malicious nodes change their transmit
powers arbitrarily without communicating this to the target node (refer Section III-1). The
received power (p0i) from a malicious anchor node can be expressed using (2) as:
pri = p0−10n log10(di)+η +κ (12)
Thus, the RSSI values from the malicious and non-malicious anchor nodes have standard de-
viation of
√
σ2+σ2att and σ , respectively. SWLS attempts to identify the malicious anchor
nodes by observing the RSSI values, and eliminates them from the localization process. The
detailed procedure of the SWLS localization is given in Algorithm 2. Let D be the P×N matrix
11
Algorithm 1 WLS Localization
Input: Pr, ai (i = 1, . . . ,N), σ
Output: tˆ = [tx, ty]T
Initialize: A,b
1: pr = 1
P
[
∑Pj=1 p
r
1 j, ∑
P
j=1 p
r
2 j, . . . ,∑
P
j=1 p
r
N j
]T
2: d =
[
d1,d2, . . . ,dN
]T
= 10
(p0−pr)
10n
3: σ2
d2
(i) = fVar
d2i
(
di,σ
)
, i = 1, ..,N (using (10))
4: W = diag
(
1/σ2
d2
(1),1/σ2
d2
(2), . . . ,1/σ2
d2
(N)
)
5: qˆ =
(
AT WA
)−1
AT Wb
6: tˆ = [qˆ1, qˆ2]
T
Algorithm 2 SWLS Localization
Input: Pr, ai (i = 1, . . . ,N), σ , ζ
Output: tˆ = [tx, ty]T
Initialize: A, b, M= /0
1: D = 10
P0−Pr
10n
2: pr = 1
P
[
∑Pj=1 p
r
1 j, ∑
P
j=1 p
r
2 j, . . . ∑
P
j=1 p
r
N j
]T
3: d = 10
P0−pr
10n =
[
d1, d2, . . . ,dN
]T
4: for i = 1 to N do
5: σˆest = argmin
σest≥0
∣∣Var(di1,di2, . . . ,diP)− fVard (di,σest)∣∣, using (13)
6: M=M∪{i | σˆest < ζ σ} (index of non-malicious nodes)
7: end for
8: σ2
d2
(k) = fVar
d2
(
dk,σ
)
where k ∈M, using (10)
9: Aˆ = A( j, :), bˆ = b( j, :), j ∈M
10: W = diag
(
1/σ2
d2
(1), 1/σ2
d2
(2), . . . ,1/σ2
d2
(card(M)))
11: qˆ =
(
AˆT WAˆ
)−1
AˆT Wbˆ
12: tˆ = [qˆ1, qˆ2]
T
12
of distance estimates from the target node to each of the anchor nodes i.e., D =
[
di j
]
where
i = 1, . . . ,N and j = 1, . . . ,P, computed using (4). The average distance
(
di
)
between the target
node and an anchor node is calculated using pr obtained from the RSSI values of P packets and
not as a column average of the matrix D. This is due to the fact that the estimated distances
(di) do not follow a Gaussian distribution (refer (8)).
Variance of the distance estimates is calculated based on the estimated distances from each
of the P packets and using (9) for different values of the noise standard deviation. An estimate
of the noise standard deviation (σest) is obtained for each of the anchor nodes by minimizing∣∣Var(di1,di2, . . . ,diP)− f vard (di,σest)∣∣ where Var(di1,di2, . . . ,diP) represents the variance of the
distance estimates calculated from each of the P packets. The malicious nodes are identified by
applying a threshold on σˆest with the threshold level set to ζ σ where ζ > 0. Finally, weighted
least square localization (as discussed in Algorithm 1) is applied by considering only the non-
malicious anchor nodes. The closed-form solution of the estimate σˆest is given by (used in line
5 of Algorithm 2):
σˆest =
√√√√18.86n2 ln(0.5+0.5√1+ 4Var(di1,di2, . . . ,diP)
di
2
)
(13)
The derivation of (13) is provided in the Appendix A.
This technique relies on the variance in the RSSI values, and in the case of a coordinated
attack the variance remains the same for malicious and non-malicious nodes (refer (3)). Thus,
this technique is not robust to coordinated attacks on the localization process.
C. Localization using ℓ1-norm Optimization
The localization problem can be posed as a 3-dimensional plane fitting problem z = f (x,y)
where z represents b, and x, y represent the first two columns of A (refer (11)). The objective
is to find a plane z = αx + βy+ γ where α = tx, β = ty, and γ = (tx)2+ (ty)2, that fits the
measurements (or data points) 〈−2axi ,−2ayi ,di
2− (axi )2− (ayi )2〉, i = 1, . . . ,N. The values of α ,
β , and γ can be obtained by minimizing the ℓ2-norm based distance between the measurements
and the plane:
min
u
‖r‖22
subject to r = Au−b
(14)
13
Fig. 3: Planes containing measurements corresponding to the malicious and non-malicious anchor
nodes. Anchor nodes are randomly distributed with 31% of the anchor nodes being malicious,
measurement noise (σ ) is 0 dB, and ‖t− tatt‖2 = 35.35 m.
where u = [α,β ,γ]T . The closed form solution of (14) is u = A†b [34] where † represents the
pseudo inverse. This is similar to the localization process discussed in Algorithm 1.
In an uncoordinated attack scenario, the measurements representing points in three dimensions
are divided into two categories on the basis of the variance in the received power. Measurements
from non-malicious nodes display less variance than those from malicious nodes. From a curve
fitting perspective, the data points corresponding to the malicious nodes can be treated as outliers.
However, in a coordinated attack, measurements from all the nodes display similar variance since
the malicious nodes do not vary their transmit power randomly (refer (3)). The transmit power
of the malicious anchor nodes is assumed to be different from those of the non-malicious anchor
nodes, and depends on the value of χi. Fig. 3 shows a coordinated attack visualized as a plane
fitting problem. The data points corresponding to the measurements from malicious and non-
malicious anchor nodes are shown to lie on two different planes. Determining these planes will
enable us to estimate the location of the target node (t) and the location where the malicious
anchor nodes intend to make the target node appear to be located (tatt). As ‖t− tatt‖2 increases
the measurements corresponding to the malicious anchor nodes move farther from the plane that
fits the measurements from non-malicious anchor nodes.
In a coordinated attack scenario, measurements from the malicious anchor nodes can thus be
treated as outliers. Hence, under both uncoordinated and coordinated attacks, the optimization
14
problem (14) can be rewritten as a robust plane fitting problem by replacing the ℓ2-norm in the
objective with an ℓ1-norm [34], [35]:
min
u
‖r‖1
subject to r = Au−b
(15)
(15) can be solved efficiently using ADMM [36] by reformulating it as:
min
u,z
‖z‖1
subject to Au− z = b
(16)
Using the standard ADMM steps, (16) can be solved iteratively as:
uk+1 = GAT
(
b+ zk− y
k
ρ
)
(16a)
zk+1 = S 1
ρ
(
Auk+1−bk + y
k
ρ
)
(16b)
yk+1 = yk +ρ
(
Auk+1− zk+1−b
)
(16c)
where G = (AT A)−1, y is the dual variable (Lagrange multiplier), and ρ (> 0) is the penalty
parameter for the violation of the linear constraint [37]. S 1
ρ
(x) =
{
max
(
|x|− 1ρ ,0
)
.sign(x)
}
is
the proximal operator of ℓ1 [38]. The convergence criteria for solving (16) using ADMM is∣∣‖zk+1‖1−‖zk‖1∣∣≤ConvADMM, where ConvADMM > 0.
We propose two localization techniques LN-1 and LN-1E. LN-1 attempts to solve the opti-
mization problem (16) in order to localize the target node in both uncoordinated and coordinated
attack scenarios. LN-1E is an improvement over LN-1 to handle only coordinated attacks. LN-
1E identifies the malicious anchor nodes by applying LN-1 and then recomputes the plane
by solving (16) after eliminating the measurements corresponding to the malicious anchor
nodes. Using LN-1, we determine the “best fitting" plane for the measurements from all the
anchor nodes fˆ (x,y) = α̂x+ β̂ y+ γ̂ . It is found that the data points corresponding to the non-
malicious anchor nodes are closer to this plane than those corresponding to the malicious anchor
nodes. K-means clustering [39] is used to partition the anchor nodes into two groups based
on their distance from this plane. The steps for implementing LN-1 and LN-1E are listed in
Algorithm 3. The node-to-plane distances are grouped into two clusters using the K-means
clustering algorithm, and the centroid of the cluster containing the malicious nodes is always
farther from the plane than the centroid of the other cluster. After identifying the two clusters,
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we recompute the “best fitting" plane for the measurements only from the non-malicious anchor
nodes as fˆnew(x,y) = α̂newx+ β̂newy+ γ̂new.
Algorithm 3 LN-1 and LN-1E Localization
Input: A, b, N
Output: Estimated target locations tˆLN1, tˆLN1E
Computing the “best fitting" plane using measurements from all the anchor nodes:
1: û =
[
α̂ β̂ γ̂
]T
by solving (16)
2: fˆ (x,y) = αˆx+ βˆ y+ γˆ
3: tˆLN1 =
[
α̂ β̂
]T
4: Compute distances d
p
i of the data points 〈−2axi ,−2ayi ,di
2− (axi )2−
(
a
y
i
)2〉 from the plane
fˆ (x,y), i = 1, ...,N.
5: Using K-means algorithm, group the distances d
p
i into two clusters. The cluster closer to
the plane fˆ (x,y) is assumed to represent the non-malicious anchor nodes.
6: fˆnew(x,y) = α̂newx + β̂newy + γ̂new, using only measurements from non-malicious anchor
nodes.
7: ûnew =
[
α̂new β̂new γ̂new
]T
by solving (16)
8: tˆLN1E =
[
α̂new β̂new
]T
Remark. The identification of malicious anchor nodes will also enable determining the location
tatt where the malicious nodes intend to make the target appear to be located. This can be useful
from a security perspective in many applications and will be explored as part of future work.
V. CRAMER-RAO LOWER BOUND (CRLB)
CRLB provides a lower bound on the variance of an unbiased estimator and can be used
as a benchmark for other estimators [7], [40]. The mean square error (MSE) of an unbiased
estimator
(
tˆ
)
of the target node position (t) can be expressed as shown below and bounded
using the CRLB as:
MSE
(
tˆ
)
= E
[(
tˆx− tx)2]+E[(tˆy− ty)2]= Var(tˆx)+Var(tˆy)≥ [F−1]
11
+
[
F−1
]
22
= tr
(
F−1
)
where F is the Fisher information matrix (FIM). The RMSE of an unbiased estimator satisfies
RMSE
(
tˆ
) ≥√tr(F−1). Thus, the CRLB provides a lower bound on the RMSE of unbiased
estimators for estimating the target node position.
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For computing the CRLB, we assume that the identity of malicious and non-malicious anchor
nodes is known. In addition, σ and σatt are assumed to be known. We define Anm and Am as
sets containing the indices of non-malicious and malicious anchor nodes, respectively.
A. CRLB for Uncoordinated Attack
The probability density function (PDF) of the received signal power at the target node in an
uncoordinated attack can be expressed as:
p(Pr; t) =
P
∏
j=1
 ∏
i∈Anm
1√
2piσ2
exp
−
(
pri j− p0+10n log10(di)
)2
2σ2
× ∏
k∈Am
1√
2piσ2eff
exp
−
(
prk j− p0+10n log10(dk)
)2
2σ2eff
 (17)
where σ2eff = σ
2+σ2att. The PDF p(P
r; t) satisfies the regularity conditions E
[
∂ ln(p(Pr;t))
∂ tx
]
= 0
and E
[
∂ ln(p(Pr;t))
∂ ty
]
= 0, and therefore, the CRLB is given by tucCRLB =
√
tr(F−1uc ) where the FIM
is given by Fuc =
[
f ucxx f
uc
xy ; f
uc
yx f
uc
yy
]
where:
f ucxx =
100Pn2
ln2(10)
[
1
σ2 ∑
i∈Anm
(axi − tx)2
‖ai− t‖42
+
1
σ2eff
∑
k∈Am
(axk− tx)2
‖ak− t‖42
]
f ucyy =
100Pn2
ln2(10)
[
1
σ2 ∑
i∈Anm
(ayi − ty)2
‖ai− t‖42
+
1
σ2eff
∑
k∈Am
(ay
k
− ty)2
‖ak− t‖42
]
(18)
f ucxy =
100Pn2
ln2(10)
[
1
σ2 ∑
i∈Anm
(axi − tx)(ayi − ty)
‖ai− t‖42
+
1
σ2eff
∑
k∈Am
(axk− tx)(ayk− ty)
‖ak− t‖42
]
B. CRLB for Coordinated Attack
The PDF of the measurement matrix Pr in a coordinated attack can be expressed as:
p(Pr; t) =
1√
2piσ2
P
∏
j=1
[
∏
i∈Anm
exp
−
(
pri j− p0+10n log10(di)
)2
2σ2 ∏
k∈Am
exp
−
(
prk j− p0+10n log10(d′k)
)
2σ2
2]
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TABLE I
Different localization techniques being compared.
Algorithm Description Uncoordinated Coordinated
LS Least Square based localization [41] ✓ ✗
Grad-Desc Iterative gradient descent with selective pruning [29] ✓ ✓
LMdS Least Median Square [30] ✓ ✓
WLS Weighted LS ✓ ✓
SWLS Secure Weighted LS ✓ ✗
LN-1 ℓ1-Norm based ✓ ✓
LN-1E ℓ1-Norm based with malicious anchor node elimination ✗ ✓
ML ML estimator (20), initialized with true target node location ✓ ✗
where d′k = ‖ak− tatt‖2. The PDF p(Pr; t) satisfies the regularity conditions E
[
∂ ln(p(Pr;t))
∂ tx
]
= 0
and E
[
∂ ln(p(Pr;t))
∂ ty
]
= 0, and therefore the CRLB in the coordinated attack is tcCRLB =
√
tr(F−1c ).
The FIM for coordinated attack is given by Fc = [ f
c
xx f
c
xy; f
c
yx f
c
yy] where:
f cxx =
100Pn2
σ2 ln2(10)
[
∑
i∈Anm
(axi − tx)2
‖ai− t‖42
+ ∑
k∈Am
(axk− txatt)2
‖ak− tatt‖42
]
f cyy =
100Pn2
σ2 ln2(10)
[
∑
i∈Anm
(a
y
i − ty)2
‖ai− t‖42
+ ∑
k∈Am
(a
y
k− tyatt)2
‖ak− tatt‖42
]
(19)
f cxy =
100Pn2
σ2 ln2(10)
[
∑
i∈Anm
(axi − tx)(ayi − ty)
‖ai− t‖42
+ ∑
k∈Am
(axk− txatt)(ayk− tyatt)
‖ak− tatt‖42
]
The estimators discussed in this paper (refer Table I) are biased (determined via simulation)
and thus the CRLB cannot be used to lower bound their performance. However, the CRLB is
used as a benchmark as it represents the minimum RMSE that can be achieved by an unbiased
estimator.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have carried out extensive performance evaluation of the proposed secure localization
techniques and compared it with four existing techniques from the literature, namely least squares
(LS) [7], LMdS [30], gradient descent (Grad-Desc) [29], [42], and maximum likelihood (ML) [7]
methods. We consider a network spread over a 100 m×100 m area with 29 anchor nodes and
one target node. Anchor nodes are set to transmit at −10 dBm (p0), and the path loss exponent
(n) is assumed to be 4 representing a suburban environment [43].
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The LS method solves for the target node location as tˆ =
(
AT A
)−1
AT b. ML estimate for the
target node location is obtained by solving the non-convex optimization problem:
tˆ = argmin
t
N
∑
i=1
P
∑
j=1
(
pri j− p0+10n log10 (di)
)2
(20)
We solve (20) using the fminunc function in Matlab which is based on the quasi-Newton
method [44]. ML is initialized with the true location of the target node. For LMdS, we consider
20 (intersecting) subsets with each subset consisting of 4 anchor nodes. For Grad-Desc, the
maximum number of iterations is 200 and a constant step size of 0.4 is chosen. Variable step
size is not considered as its performance is reported to be similar to that with a constant step
size [29]. The threshold for the anchor selection or pruning step in Grad-Desc is empirically
set to a value that gives the best performance. In SWLS, ζ is empirically set to 1.5. LN-1 and
LN-1E use ADMM to solve (16), and the value of ConvADMM and ρ are determined empirically
and set to 10−6 and 0.2, respectively. The maximum number of iterations for allowing ADMM
to converge is set to 5000. All results reported in this paper are based on 5000 Monte Carlo
simulations.
A. Uncoordinated Attack
Fig. 4(a) shows a randomly deployed network with 29 anchor nodes and one target node. The
network is assumed to contain 8 malicious anchor nodes (i.e., roughly 28% of the anchor nodes
are malicious) which attempt to disrupt the target node’s localization process via uncoordinated
attack. Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c) show the performance of the various secure localization techniques
in terms of the RMS localization error. The RMS localization error is shown as a function of
σatt. The target node estimates its position by executing the localization process after receiving
10 packets from each of the anchor nodes. In the Monte Carlo simulations, the topology and
the percentage of malicious anchor nodes are kept fixed, while the malicious anchor nodes are
chosen randomly from the 29 anchor nodes for each simulation run. Simulations are also carried
out to study the performance of the algorithms as the target node moves closer to the edge of
the network (refer Fig. 4(c)).
SWLS and WLS techniques assign large weights to the anchor nodes located closer to the
target node and thus reduce the effect of the larger distance estimation errors from the farther
anchor nodes in the localization process. The performance of SWLS and WLS are similar
as long as σatt is not significantly higher than the measurement noise (σ ). However, WLS
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performance deteriorates as σatt becomes higher than σ and WLS starts assigning larger weight
to the malicious anchor nodes which are close to the target node. On the other hand, SWLS
outperforms the other techniques as it attempts to eliminate the malicious anchor nodes from the
localization process. SWLS is the only estimator whose RMS localization error is closest to the
CRLB in most of the scenarios. CRLB is barely affected with the increase in the value of σatt
as only 28% of the anchor nodes are malicious. From (18), it can be seen that the CRLB will be
significantly effected when the percentage of malicious anchor nodes is higher and σatt is greater
than σ . When the target node is moved closer to the edge of the network (refer Fig. 4(c)), the
performance of Grad-Desc degrades significantly as the gradient descent algorithm appears to
get stuck in a local minima. The relative performance of the other techniques is similar to the
case when the target node was located at the center of the network.
Next we study the performance of the localization techniques as the malicious anchor nodes
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(a) Network topology for an uncoordinated attack with randomly placed anchors nodes (Percentage of malicious
anchor nodes is 28%).
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(b) RMS localization error of the secure localization techniques with σ = 2 dB as a function of σatt.
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(c) RMS localization error as a function of σatt with σ = 2 dB and the target node at location (10,60).
Fig. 4: Performance of secure localization techniques under uncoordinated attack with random
uniformly distributed anchor nodes and P = 10 packets.
are moved from the center towards the edge of the network. The network topology and the
percentage of anchor nodes are kept the same as in Fig. 4. The target node is at the center of
the network and two scenarios are considered with malicious anchors located: (i) within 32 m
of the target node, and (ii) more than 45 m from the target node. The localization performance
for these scenarios are shown in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b). It is observed that LS is significantly
affected by the position of the malicious anchor nodes and its performance deteriorates as the
malicious anchor nodes move towards the edge of the network. It is also observed from Fig. 5(a)
that LS outperforms LMdS and Grad-Desc when malicious anchor nodes are located close to the
target. LS gives equal weight to measurements from all the anchor nodes, and from Lemma IV.3
we know that distance estimates for the anchor nodes located farther from the target node tend
to have large errors due to σatt.
In Fig. 5(a), we see that the localization performance of LMdS and Grad-Desc deteriorates
gradually with increase in the value of σatt. However, as the malicious anchor nodes move
away from the target node and towards the edge of the network, these two techniques display
robustness to the attack. LMdS and Grad-Desc pick four and N
2
anchor nodes, respectively. In
Fig. 5(a), as the malicious anchor nodes are close to the target node, the residuals of the subset
in LMdS or their gradients in Grad-Desc are lower than when the malicious anchor nodes are
farther from the target nodes resulting in some malicious anchor nodes getting picked. In contrast
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(a) RMS localization error when the malicious anchor nodes are close to the target node (within 32 m).
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(b) RMS localization error when the malicious anchor nodes are located at the edge of the network.
Fig. 5: Localization performance under uncoordinated attack when the malicious anchor nodes
are moved from the center to the edge of the network. (σ = 2 dB, P= 10 packets, and percentage
of malicious anchor is 28%.)
to LS, WLS is more robust as the malicious anchor nodes move towards the edge of the network,
because it assigns large weight to the anchor nodes that are located close to the target node.
SWLS outperforms the other techniques in the scenarios shown in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5(a), SWLS
results in an abrupt increase in the RMS localization error as σatt becomes greater than σ .
For σatt < σ , σeff is almost equal to or slightly greater than σ and the localization accuracy is
not significantly affected. When σatt > σ , SWLS can identify the malicious anchor nodes and
eliminate them. However when σatt ≈ σ , SWLS fails to identify the malicious anchor nodes
resulting in a larger localization error as seen in Fig. 5(a). Similar behaviour is expected in
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Fig. 5(b) except now the malicious anchor nodes are farther from the target and are assigned
lower weights. Thus, the localization performance does not deteriorate as in Fig. 5(a). ML
outperforms WLS for higher values of σatt, otherwise exhibits similar trend as WLS. SWLS
performance in Fig. 5 is close to the CRLB and SWLS outperforms the other estimators.
The localization performance of LN-1 is not affected by the position of the malicious anchor
nodes. LN-1 performance is similar in all cases considered in Fig. 5 as well as in the case
where the malicious anchor nodes are randomly placed (refer Fig. 4(b)). LN-1 does not weight
the anchor nodes differently based on the position nor eliminates any anchor nodes from the
localization process. It reduces the weight of those measurements that exhibit higher variance
(outliers) and thus its localization performance is affected by σatt and σ .
Fig. 6 shows the result of simulations carried out to understand the effect of the number
of packets (P) and the percentage of malicious anchor nodes on the localization performance.
The network topology is the same as in Fig. 4(a). Fig. 6(a) shows that with P = 2, LN-1 and
Grad-Desc outperform WLS and SWLS, however as P increases WLS and SWLS outperform
the other techniques. As P increases, the estimated distances become more accurate resulting
in a better estimate of the variance of d2 (refer (10)), and thus the performance of WLS and
SWLS improves at a faster rate than the other techniques (except LS). For P > 10, the RMS
localization error of WLS and SWLS is close to ML and CRLB, respectively.
In Fig. 6(b), the localization performance of all the techniques is found to deteriorate as
the percentage of malicious anchor nodes increases. From (18), as card(Am) increases (and
card (Anm) decreases), the individual elements of the Fisher matrix Fuc decrease since σeff > σ .
Thus the overall CRLB also increases with the number of malicious anchor nodes in the system.
The performance of Grad-Desc, LN-1, LMdS, and SWLS begins to deteriorate at a faster rate
when the percentage of malicious anchor nodes exceeds 50%. In this scenario, SWLS is able to
eliminate the malicious anchor nodes and computes the target node position using the remaining
non-malicious anchor nodes. The performance deteriorates due to the relatively fewer anchor
nodes. LMdS estimates the target node position using a subset of four anchor nodes, and as
the percentage of malicious anchor nodes increases, the chances of LMdS picking one or more
malicious anchor nodes in its final subset also increase.
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(a) RMS localization error as a function of the number of received packets (P) (σ = 2 dB, σatt = 6 dB, and 28%
of the anchor nodes are malicious).
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(b) RMS localization error as a function of the percentage of malicious anchor nodes (σ = 2 dB, σatt = 4 dB, and
P = 10 packets).
Fig. 6: Performance of secure localization techniques as a function of the number of received
packets and percentage of malicious anchors in uncoordinated attack.
B. Coordinated attack
For coordinated attack, we consider the following localization techniques: WLS, Grad-Desc,
LMdS, LN-1, and LN-1E. The other techniques result in poor localization performance under
coordinated attack. SWLS does not perform well as it attempts to differentiate malicious anchor
nodes from non-malicious ones based on the variation in the received power. This strategy fails
as the malicious anchor nodes maintain a fixed transmit power in coordinated attack. Thus, we
have not considered SWLS technique for the coordinated attack scenario. Fig. 7 presents the
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(a) RMS localization error when 10% of anchor nodes are malicious.
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(b) RMS localization error when 28% of anchor nodes are malicious with the target node at location (5,50).
Fig. 7: Performance of secure localization techniques in coordinated attack scenario (σ = 2 dB
and P = 10 packets).
localization performance for a coordinated attack scenario as the distance between t and tatt is
increased. The network topology is the same as in Fig. 4(a).
In Fig. 7(a), with 10% malicious anchor nodes, WLS significantly outperforms the other
techniques when the coordinated attack is mild. However, as the attack becomes stronger the
WLS performance deteriorates rapidly. LN-1 and LN-1E result in similar performance and both
outperform LMdS and Grad-Desc. The poor performance of LMdS and Grad-Desc is due to
the elimination of certain anchor nodes from the localization process. When the percentage of
malicious anchor nodes is low and tatt is close to t, eliminating the malicious anchor nodes
does not improve the localization accuracy as the measurement noise tends to determine the
localization performance.
In Fig. 7(b), we show the performance of the localization techniques as the target node moves
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(b) RMS localization error with tatt = [t
x + 1.5 ty + 1.5]T and ‖t− tatt‖2 =2.12 m.
Fig. 8: Performance of the secure localization techniques in a coordinated attack as a function
of the percentage of malicious anchor nodes (σ = 2 dB and P = 10 packets).
closer to the edge of the network. The performance of Grad-Desc degrades significantly, while
the performance of LN-1E and LMdS are similar and degrade to a lesser extent. From (19), it
is noted that the FIM Fc does not directly depend on ‖t− tatt‖2, and thus the CRLB in Fig. 7 is
almost constant. It is also observed that Grad-Desc, LMdS, LN-1, and LN-1E follow a similar
trend as the CRLB.
In Fig. 8, we study the localization performance under a coordinated attack as a function
of the percentage of malicious anchor nodes. This has been simulated for two different values
of tatt representing mild and severe forms of the attack. In Fig. 8(a), it is seen that Grad-
Desc, LMdS, LN-1, and LN-1E outperform WLS when the percentage of malicious anchor
nodes is less than 50%. However, as the percentage of malicious anchor nodes goes above 50%
WLS outperforms the other techniques. Grad-Desc retains 50% of the anchor nodes, and as
26
the percentage of malicious anchor nodes exceeds 50%, it ends up using measurements from
malicious nodes for localization. LMdS also fails to consistently find a subset containing only
non-malicious anchor nodes. For LN-1 and LN-1E, the number of outliers increases with the
increase in the percentage of malicious anchor nodes. This affects the robustness of ℓ1-norm
optimization as the measurements from the malicious anchor nodes are assigned the same weight
as measurements from non-malicious anchor nodes. Unlike Grad-Desc, LMdS, and LN-1E, LN-1
does not attempt to classify or cluster the measurements and instead it fits a continuous function
to the measurements. Thus, when the percentage of malicious anchor nodes exceeds 50%, LN-1
achieves better performance than Grad-Desc, LMdS, and LN-1E.
In Fig. 8(b), we consider a milder form of the coordinated attack where the malicious anchor
nodes attempt to make the target node appear at (tx+1.5, ty+1.5) instead of its true location (tx,
ty). In this case, WLS outperforms the other techniques and it is followed by LN-1 and LN-1E.
The performance of Grad-Desc, LMdS, and LN-1E is comparatively poor due to their anchor
elimination process. From the CRLB expression for a coordinated attack (19), it is seen that as
the percentage of malicious anchor nodes increases, card(Am) increases and at the same time
card(Anm) decreases, such that the CRLB remains almost constant.
C. Computational Complexity
We next present a comparison of the computational complexity of the different localization
techniques. Table II shows the asymptotic complexities of the secure localization techniques
considered in this work. For WLS, line 5 of Algorithm 1 is the dominant computational step.
Computing qˆ requires five matrix multiplications and one matrix inversion. Therefore, the compu-
tational complexity of WLS is given by O (3N2+9N +3N +33+32+N2) ≃ O (N2). Similarly,
the computational complexity of LS is O (N2) and SWLS is O((card(M))2), where M
is the set of non-malicious anchor nodes identified by SWLS. LN-1 executes (16a), (16b),
and (16c) in an iterative manner until convergence is achieved. Assuming ADMM requires
kADMM iterations on average to converge, and the computational complexity of (16a) is O (N),
the computational complexity for the ADMM steps is O (kADMMN). Thus, the computational
complexity of LN-1 is O (max(kADMMN,N2)) ≃ O (kADMMN), as kADMM > N in general. In
addition to the steps in LN-1, LN-1E involves K-means clustering which has a complexity of
O (NT kK-means) [45], where kK-means is the number of average iterations and T is the complexity
for calculating the distance between two data points. The computational complexity of LN-1E
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TABLE II
Computational complexity of the different localization techniques.
LS WLS SWLS LN-1 LN-1E Grad-Desc LMdS
O
(
N2
)
O
(
card(M)2
)
O (kADMMN) O (max(NT kK-means,kADMMN)) O (kGDN) O
(
MLMdSN
2
)
is O (max(NT kK-means,kADMMN)). LMdS algorithm involves two main operations: (i) dividing
the RSSI measurements into MLMdS subsets with each subset consisting of NLMdS anchor nodes,
and the target location is estimated for each subset using LS technique, and (ii) computing
median of the residue of the results obtained from each of the subsets. The computational
complexity of the first operation is O (MLMdSN2LMdS) and the second operation is O (MLMdSN2).
Since N > NLMdS in general, LMdS has a computational complexity of O
(
MLMdSN
2
)
. The
computational complexity of Grad-Desc is O (kGDN) where kGD is the total number of iterations.
From Table II it can be observed that the computational complexity of LN-1, LN-1E, and Grad-
Desc varies linearly with the number of anchor nodes in the network.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented localization techniques that are robust in the presence of malicious
anchor nodes in the network. We proposed four secure localization techniques WLS, SWLS,
LN-1, and LN-1E, and compared their performance with the existing techniques Grad-Desc and
LMdS. Two types of attacks were considered: uncoordinated and coordinated. All nodes in the
network are assumed to transmit at a fixed power level which is known to the target node. The
localization attacks are executed by the malicious anchor nodes by changing their transmit power
and not reporting it to the target node. For uncoordinated attacks, the localization performance
was studied with variation in the transmit power of the malicious anchor nodes, location of the
malicious anchor nodes (close or far from the target node), number of packets P, and percentage
of malicious anchor nodes in the network. SWLS outperformed all the other techniques and was
close to the CRLB in most cases. The performance of WLS was found to deteriorate for σatt > σ
or when many malicious anchor nodes are located close to the target node. On the other hand,
LN-1 is neither affected by an increase in σatt nor by a change in the locations of the malicious
anchor nodes. For coordinated attacks, the localization performance was studied as a function
of the severity of the attack in terms of the distance between the actual and reported locations
of the target node and variation in the percentage of malicious anchor nodes. LN-1 and LN-1E
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perform better than the other techniques with lower percentage of malicious anchor nodes and
under milder form of the coordinated attack. WLS outperforms all other techniques when the
attack is mild or the percentage of malicious anchor nodes exceeds 50%. The computational
complexity of LN-1 and LN-1E varies linearly with the number of anchor nodes in the network.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF (13)
Let l(σest), v− f vard (di,σest) where v = Var(di1,di2, . . . ,diP). It can be shown that:
∂ 2 fVardi (di,σest)
∂σ2est
=
2di
2
18.86n2
exp
(
σ2est
18.86n2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k1
2exp
(
σ2est
18.86n2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k2
(
1+
4σ2est
18.86n2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k3
−
(
1+
2σ2est
18.86n2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k4

where k2k3−k4 is always positive because k3≥ k4 and k2≥ 2. So,
∂ 2 fVardi
(di,σest)
∂σ2est
≥ 0 and fVardi (di,σest)
is a convex function. Therefore, l(σest) is a concave function.
Remark. If function f :R+0 →R is even, concave, f (x = 0)≥ 0, and ∃ε (≥ 0) such that f (x)≤ ε
then x∗ = argmin
x≥0
| f (x)| =⇒ f (x∗) = 0.
Using the above remark, optimal value (σˆest) of the optimization problem in line 5 of Al-
gorithm 2 can be obtained by solving l(σˆest) = 0 as l(σest) is concave, even function with
l(σest = 0) = v as f
var
d (di,σest = 0) = 0, and is upper bounded by a non-negative constant(
l(σest)≤ v, as f vard (di,σest)≥ 0
)
. The objective function of the optimization problem under
consideration i.e., |l(σest)| is neither convex nor concave when σest ≥ 0 as |l(σest)| is concave
when σest ∈ [0, σˆest] and convex when σest ∈ [σˆest,∞).
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